Sadašnji šef Sabora Gordan Jandroković imao je zanimljive ocjene o Hrvatima u BiH, prema dokumentu s Wikileaksa. Naime on se u Zagrebu sastao, dok je bio ministar vanjskih poslova, sa Stjuartom Jonesom, tadašnjim Zamjenikom pomoćnika državnog tajnika u Uredu za europske i euroazijske poslove State Departmenta.
U depeši se prepričava što su razgovarali u četiri oka o tadašnjoj političkoj situaciji u susjednim zemljama, pa tako i u BiH.
Prvi dio dokumenta, zaključak govori, između ostalog, da je Jandroković “naglasio potporu Hrvatske jačanju Bosne kao zemlje i opisao potporu trećem entitetu među nekim bosanskim Hrvatima kao “glupu” i “za nas neprihvatljivu”.
U dijelu depeše oko BiH, točka 5. (C) stoji kako je Jandroković je bio vrlo otvoren protivnik prijedloga bosanskih Hrvata za “treći entitet”. On je rekao da potpora vođe HDZ-a 1990. Ljubić takvoj ideji “glupa” i “neprihvatljiva za nas”. “Mora misliti na budućnost Hrvata i mora biti konstruktivniji. ”
Jones je naveo da je prethodne večeri dok su večerali Dodik prvi podržao treći entitet, a onda je i Ljubić podržao i istaknuo kako je to signal
koliko je ideja bila rizična.
Jandroković je kimnuo glavom i rekao da je uvjeren da vođa HDZ BiH Čović nije podržao takvu ideju na večeri. Jones je rekao da je to točno.
Inače, Božo Ljubić je sad u istom HDZ-u kao Jandroković, uz to Jandoković mu je i šef u Saboru.
Originalni tekst s Wikileaksa:
EUR DAS JONES MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GORDAN JANDROKOVIC
Date:2008 September 17, 08:31 (Wednesday)
1. (C) EUR DAS Stuart Jones visited Zagreb on September 10
and met with Croatian FM Gordan Jandrokovic. Jandrokovic
opened the meeting by stressing that Croatia’s top foreign
policy priorities are NATO membership, EU accession, and
establishing good relations with its neighbors. Jandrokovic
thanked the US for its support of Croatia in all three areas.
The conversation then focused on regional issues.
Jandrokovic described relations with Serbia as crucial, but
difficult. He said Croatia would soon open an embassy in
Pristina, but hoped Kosovar officials would be more
pro-active in their diplomacy. He stressed Croatian support
for strengthening Bosnia as a country, and described support
for a third entity among some Bosnian Croats as “stupid” and
“unacceptable to us.” END SUMMARY
2. (C) Jandrokovic said good relations with Serbia were a key
to stability in the region. The GoC has tried to support
pro-European forces in Belgrade, but have found it a
difficult process as politicians in Serbia attempt to balance
cooperation with the EU with a less cooperative stance toward
neighbors such as Croatia. Croatia was looking and hoping
for signals of a more constructive attitude from Belgrade,
but, Jandrokovic said, “so far we did not get any.”
3. (C) Jandrokovic said that Croatia’s consistent message to
Belgrade was that it needed to accept reality on Kosovo.
Croatia was in the process of nominating its first ambassador
to Pristina, and should open an embassy there shortly.
Croatia was committed to helping Kosovo build its
relationship with the EU, and Croatian businesses were very
interested in potential opportunities there. Jandrokovic did
complain, however, that Kosovar officials needed to be more
active in their own diplomacy. As an example, he noted that
he had never had a request from any Kosovar official to meet
with him. He hoped Kosovo’s new FM would be more engaged,
saying that “he needs to come see me and tell me what they
want” in terms of support from Croatia. DAS Jones said he
would pass that message to the Kosovars during his visit to
Pristina the next day. Jandrokovic added that the GoC
believed Montenegro and Macedonia would likely recognize
Kosovo soon, and that Croatia was encouraging such a step.
DAS Jones noted US opposition to Serbia’s attempt to have the
UNGA refer Kosovar independence to the ICJ. FM Jandrokovic
said Croatia would support the US position.
4. (C) Jandrokovic noted that Croatia needed Bosnia to
succeed. Croatian businesses were very active there, but
Croatia’s biggest interest was to ensure that the Croatian
population in B-H stayed in B-H. Croatia was worried,
however, by the lack of political consensus in B-H. In the
GoC’s view, B-H needs a new Constitution and it needs Lajcak
and the OHR to remain in place. Right now, the Croatian
community in B-H is feeling insecure and uncomfortable, and
this has created serious internal divisions. Croatia’s key
priority in any political reform for B-H, therefore, was to
ensure that ethnic Croats remained one of the three
constituent nations. This was not only to reassure the
Croatian community in B-H, but because without all three
communities involved, B-H would fall apart into a
Serb-dominated state and a Bosniak-dominated state.
Jandrokovic said it was increasingly clear to Croatia that
Dodik’s goal is to have a separate Serb state; there had been
questions about this earlier, but it now seems clear to
Zagreb that this is Dodik’s ambition. Croatia would oppose
this, but the political situation of Croatians continued to
be perilous, he said, citing a recent decision to
disenfranchise 2000 ethnic Croatian voters from the Posavina
region around Derventa in the Republika Srpska for the
upcoming local elections.
5. (C) Jandrokovic was very outspoken in opposition to
Bosnian Croat proposals for a “third entity.” He said that
HDZ 1990 leader Ljubic’s support for such a notion was
“stupid” and “unacceptable to us.” “He must think of the
future of Croatians there, and must be more constructive.”
DAS Jones noted that at dinner the previous evening it had
been Dodik who had first supported a third entity, and then
been supported by Ljubic, and noted that this was a signal of
how risky the idea was. Jandrokovic nodded, and said he was
confident that HDZ BiH leader Covic had not supported such
ideas at the dinner. DAS Jones said that was correct.
Jandrokovic again commented that the “Europeanization” of B-H
was the best solution, as it would allow Croatians to stay in
B-H. He said that if we can show them that they are an
important part of the political process there, then the
Croatian community would be very constructive. The problem
is that the Croats were too insecure and afraid of what might
happen, so they retreat to the idea of a third entity, which
Jandrokovic described as both the wrong policy and an
6. (C) DAS Jones asked about GoC views of the OHR, and
suggestions that it was time to close it down. Jandrokovic
replied that this was a very bad idea. It would reward
Dodik’s bad behavior. The B-H Croats had seen Dodik
challenge Lajcak, and go unpunished, and this had encouraged
the B-H Croats to begin picking fights with Lajcak as well.
What B-H needed was for the EU to re-focus its attention on
Bosnia. If Bosnia was unstable, then the entire region would
be unstable. But he said he was not sure senior EU officials
7. (C) Jandrokovic said relations with Montenegro were very
good, and this was another country of great interest to
Croatian business people. From Zagreb’s perspective the
Montenegrins seemed a bit nervous about the situation in the
region, and were still navigating how to get a bit more
“distance” from Belgrade.
8. (C) Croatia was very supportive of Macedonia, but it was
unclear to Zagreb what could be done to solve the name issue.
Jandrokovic said that when Macedonian FM Milososki told him
that Greece “cannot hold Macedonia hostage forever” that he
had warned him that maybe Greece could. Jandrokovic felt
that now was the time for the GoM to make the tough decisions
necessary and to secure their state and identity. Skopje
needed to make a compromise and “choose which bad scenario is
the better one for them.” DAS Jones said that the parties
would meet again the week of September 15 in NY and UN envoy
Nimetz would have some new proposals. Jandrokovic said
Croatia would do whatever it could to support, and said “just
tell us of the ideas you would like us to support” and
Croatia would be ready to weigh in, particularly with
Milososki, whom Jandrokovic said he knew and got along with
9. (U) DAS Jones has cleared this cable.